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ABSTRACT
Thispaper begirE by identifying the distinguishing characteristic of the
"real business cycle" (RBC) class of macroeconomic models.It then
scruitinizes existing evidence, presented in support of the RBC approach, of
three types: calibrated general equilibrium models with no monetary sector,
vector-autoregression variance decomposition results, and univariate
measurements of trend and cyclical components. It is argued that, in fact,
these types of evidence have so far provided little support for the RBC
hypothesis.Finally, with regard to an important alternative hypothesis
concerning macroeconomic fluctuations, the paper proposes a partial
rationalization for the stickiness of nominal product prices.
BennettT. McCallum
Graduate School of Industrial
Administration
Carnegie-Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 152131. Introduction
ithasnow been 50 years since J.M. Keynes published his incomparably
controversial General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. After a
few apparent trends and a number of cycles in professionalopinion, the
macroeconomic debates of today have much in common with those of 1936
and the years that followed shortly after. In particular, with the recent
downturn in popularity of the Lucas-Barro theory of cyclical fluctuations
1
inducedby monetary misperceptions, the main competing explanations for
these fluctuations are provided by the "real business cycle" and "sticky price"
(or "nominal rigidity") types of models, which are rather strongly
representative of Classical and Keynesian viewpoints, respectively. Allied
with these two views, moreover, are sharply divergent notionsconcerning
the nature of unemployment and the seriousness, in terms of individuals'
welfare, of fluctuations in measured unemployment rates.
As part of the ongoing effort to achieve an understanding of the
macroeconomic phenomena with which this debate is concerned, the present
paper begins in Section 2 by characterizing the real business cycle class of
theories and scrutinizing one type of evidence that has led some researchers
to embrace this approach. Sections 3 and 4 are then devoted to somewhat
longer discussions of two other types of evidence pertaining to the real
business cycle hypothesis. Then in Section 5 the discussion turns to a
leading problem for sticky-price theories, viz., the difficulty of rationalizing
the abundance of contracts set in nominal terms. Finally, Section 6includes
some conclusions and reflections on the nature of macroeconomic
fluctuations.
12. Real Business Cycle Models
Let us begin by stating explicitly what will here be meant by the real
business cycle—henceforth, RBC—class of theories. In that regard, it seems
clear that the distinguishing characteristic of RBC models is a denial that
monetary policy actions have any significant impact on aggregate outputand
employment magnitudes.Admittedly, that hypothesis is not explicitly
expressed in some of the significant papers in the RBC literature,and is
possibly disbelieved by some of the main contributors. Butif the class of
models is distinctive enough to warrant a special label, it must have some
distinguishing characteristic and there would seem to be no other contenders.
There is in the literature a lot of emphasis on "propagation mechanisms"—
sources of serial correlation in output or employment—but that isalso true
of earlier contributions such as Lucas (1975), Sargent (1979, Ch. 16),
Blinder and Fischer (1981), and others that are not regarded as comprising
RBC models. The fact that Lucas (1972), Barro (1976), and other rational-
expectations models ignored serial correlation does notindicate that the
authors believed such correlations to be nonexistent. The reason, rather,
was that they wanted to concentrate, without severe distractions, onthe
single issue that seemed most interesting and difficult—why the aggregate
data exhibited a Phillips relationship, i.e., a positive association between
output/employment levels and the rate of change of nominal magnitudessuch
as the money stock. Emphasis on propagation mechanisms, to return tothe
point, does not provide a line of demarcation between RI3C andother classes
of models; denial of monetary effects does.
The RBC point of view does not deny, of course, that there is any
2association between output and monetary magnitudes. But it attributes the
observed money—output correlation to so—cal led "reverse causation," i.e.,
responses of the money stock, via the monetary authorityand/or the banking
sector, to variations in aggregate output. Thus, the R]3C theories ineffect
claim that observed Phillips-type correlations stem from the monetary
system's reaction to output fluctuations that are induced by realshocks to
tastes or technology—not from the non-bank private sector's reaction to
monetary shocks.
Encouragement to the adoption of the RBC view has come fromboth
theoretical and empirical studies.With respect to the former, this
encouragement has been primarily negative—involvingdisenchantment on
theoretical grounds with both of the leading alternative theories, the
monetary misperception theory of Lucas and Barro on the onehand and the
price-stickiness or nominal-contract approach of Fischer (1977),Taylor
(1980), et. a!. on the other hand. Of equal importance, however, has been
the compilation of statistical evidence that appears—at least on the surface-
to support the idea that monetary shocks have no significant
output/employment effects. In this regard, three major types ofevidence
have been provided. First, there are the studies of Sims (1980) (1982) and
Litterman and Weiss (1985) which show that there is very little
explanatory power for output variations provided by money stock innovations
in vector autoregression (VAR) systems when nominal interest rates are
included among the system's variables. Second, there is the notable study of
Kydland and Prescott (1982), which shows that several business—cycle
correlations can be mimicked reasonably well with a competitive
3equilibrium model in which neither money nor govenrnentpolicy plays any
role whatsoever. Finally, there is a line of argument developedprimarily
by Nelson and Plosser (1982)that relies entirely on the univariate time-
series properties of aggregate output, employment,and other real variables.
Briefly, the Nelson-Plosser argument isthat most of the fluctuations in
these variables should be attributed to the trend component,in a trend vs.
cyclical decomposition, whichwould presumably be unaffected by monetary
shocks.
In this section and the two that follow, I will arguethat in fact none of
these types of evidence actually provides much supportfor the RBC position:
the statistical results that have been interpreted asfavorable evidence are
actually just as consistent with othermodels as they are with RBC models.
To demonstrate such consistency does not, furthermore, requiretortuous
analysis relying upon highly indirecteffects of questionable magnitude. In
the process of developing this argument, Iwill suggest that there is
presently in existence evidence that,while inconclusive, is awkward for the
RBC class of models.
Let us begin, because of the brevity of the necessary discussion,with the
evidence provided in the much-discussed study of Kydlandand Prescott
(1982). As mentioned above, this study demonstratesthat it is possible to
match several important features of actual postwarU.S. quarterly data with
a model that includes no monetary (or government) sector—indeed, no
nominal variables. The model is a one good, representativehousehold,
competitive equilibrium model inwhich intertemporal non-separability of
preferences and investment gestation lags are quantitativelyimportant. The
4only soia'ce of cyclical fluctuations is a technology shock--a random
disturbance to the aggregate production function—that is composed of white-
noise and autocorrelated components in a mix that cannot be observed by the
2
agents(households and firms).
The sense in which the fluctuations implied by the Kydland-Prescott
model match actual U.S. data is as follows. With parameters estimated by
means of a minimum-distance estimator with a metric that is
3
unconventional—the authors term the estimation procedure calibration"—
variances and correlations with output are calculated for several variables
(consumption, investment, inventory stocks, manhours employment, etc.) and
compared with actual U.S. quarterly values for 1950-79. The same is also
done for output autocorrelations at lags one through six. These comparisons
are reasonably favorable to the model, although Altug (1985)hasshown that
its fit is not good enough to avoid strong rejections when subjected to formal
4
hypothesistesting.
The results of Altug are not, however, the basis for my suggestion that
the Kydlarwf-Prescott model provides little if any evidence in favor of the
RBC hypothesis. My reasons are twofold. First, there are no tests carried
out or proposed of the proposition that addition of monetary variables would
riot significantly improve the model's explanatory power. Second, arid more
importantly, the Kydland-Prescott results do not show that technology shocks
are adequate to generate output, employment, etc. fluctuations of the
magnitude actually observed. Instead, as Lucas (1985) has noted, Kydland
and Prescott "simply choose the variance of the technology shock so as to be
S
consistentwith the observed GNP variability."Consequently, if someone
5believes that the variance of actual technology shocks is only 1/i.(I) (say) as
large as the value implied by the Kydland-Prescottmodel, he will find
nothing in the Kydland-Prescott results thatwould require him to alter this
6
belief.
3. Vector Autoregression Studies
Of the various studies under discussion, the first to appear in print was
that of Sims (1980), which was followed by Sims (1982). Inthese papers
Sims begins by estimating VAR systems that include among theirvariables
7
measuresof aggregate production and the money stock. He then solves for
the implied moving-average representations and finally uses thelatter to
decompose the variance of each variable into portionsattributable to the
8
innovationsof each of the system's variables.It transpires that when a
system including only money, output,and the price level is examined using
postwar U.S. data, the money stock innovationscontribute a substantial
9
fractionof the total explanatory power for output.But when some nominal
interest rate is added to such a system, the fraction of output variability
attributable to money stock innovations declines sharply—to 4% and 14%
in the two cited studies.The interpretation put forth by Sims is that
irregularity in monetary policy behavior has not been an important sourceof
postwar fluctuations in aggregate output.In Sims's words, "monetary policy
surprises are riot important in explainingthe real component of postwar
business cycles," so that "imposition of a monetarist rule to make the
quantity of money more predictable would havehad little real effect" toward
10
reducingthese fluctuations (Sims, 1980, p. 253).
It is my contention that this conclusion is not warranted by the reported
6findings. As I argued in McCallurn (1983), it is not valid in this context to
use money stock innovations to represent the surprise component of monetary
policy actions. The basic reason is that during only a part of the period
studied has the Fed paid attention to money stock targets, and in that part it
has utilized operating procedures that permit money stock control only by
way of interest rate manipulations. Thus to decreasethe rate of Ml growth
the Fed would use open-market operations to increase the federal funds rate,
this increase affecting the money stock by reducing the quentity of money
demanded. But with this type of operating procedure, irregular components
of monetary policy behavior—unsystematic actions by the monetary authority-
-will showas innovations in the VAR system's interest rate, in addition
11
to(or instead of )itsmoney stock.Consequently, to conclude that
irregular behavior by the Fed was not contributing to output fluctuations, it
would have to be shown that neither money stock nor interest rate
iri'iovations had appreciable explanatory power for output. But this is not
the case in Sims's data; the interest rate innovations tend to pick ithe
explanatory power lost by the Ml innovations when the former variable is
12
addedto the system.
A related type of consideration, it should be added, is applicable to
studies that focus on the monetary base. While the Fed could use the base
(or total reserves) as its operating instrument if it chose to do so, in fact it
has not. Even during the so-called "monetarist experiment" of 1979-82, the
Fed operated in a way that amounts to an indirect usage of the federal funds
rate as its instrument, with the base then adjusting endogenously (within the
13
intermeetingcontrol period) in response to shocks. Consequently,
7empirical analyses—such as Kingand Plosser (1984)—built on the
assumption that the basehas been used as the Fed's inatrurnent (for
implementing monetary policy) are inappropriatelydesigned and therefore
unlikely to yield results that areuseful in measuring the impact of actior
by the monetary authority.
There are some similarities between theSims findings and those in
a notable recent study by Littermanand Weiss (1985). In particular, the
latter authors also find that the portion of outputvariance attributable to
money stock innovatiordeclines sharply when a nominal interest rate is
added to a small VAR system, and they also discussmatters as if the money
stock were directly controlled by the Fed. They carryout a corEiderable
amount of additional analysis, however,much of which concerna movements
of the (ex ante) real rate of interest. Thisvariable is unobservable, of
course, but Litterman andWeiss are able to test various hypotheses
concerning its behavior by applicationof cross-eqmtion restrictione on the
VAR system, restrictiona that are implied by thedefinition of the real rate
(at period t) as the nominal rate less the rationallypredicted inflation rate
(between t and t+1). Here "rational" meanethe forecast value implied by
the VAR system.
One of the more prominent findings in theLitterman-Weiss paper is that
the real rate rt is not significantly C3ranger-causedin the quarterly U.S.
data by any of the other variables involved,which are M(log of money),
Y(log of output), P (logof price level), and R(the nominal interest rate).
On the basis of this finding, Litterman and Weiss suggestthat theories of
the Lucas-Barro and sticky-price types are contradicted bythe data, as both
8transmit monetary impulses to real variables by way of the real rate. The
impact of this suggestion is weakened, but not eliminated, by the non-
equivalence of (i) the absence of Cr-anger-causality from other variables to
r and (ii)the excgeneity of rt—the latter requiring the former and also the
absence of within-period effects from other variables to r.
Other results reported in the Litterman-Weiss paper appear, upon first
consideration, to provide evidence that is literally inconsistent with the RBC
hypothesis.In particular, as the hypothesis implies that real variables
(excepting real money balances) are block exogenot, it would appear that a
finding that '(/0rr) is Cr-anger-caused by any nominal variable would
require rejection.And figures in the Litterman-Weiss Table VII indicate
that Y is in fact Granger-caused by nominal variables. For example, line
18 on p. 152 shows that the hypothesis, that Y is explained only by past
values of itself and rt, can be rejected at the marginal significance level
0.0013—i.e., is very strongly rejected. Since the system's other variables
are Mt,and R, it then follows that the log of output is strongly Granger-
caused by some nominal variable (or variables).
Litterman and Weiss provide an example, however, which demonstrates
that an empirical finding of Granger-causality from nominal to real
variables does not actually imply that the latter set fails to be block-
exogenous to the former. This possibility, also mentioned by Eichenbaum
and Singleton (1986), can arise if the true system includes an important
variable that is unobservable to the econometrician and is consequently
omitted from the empirical analysis.In the Litterman-Weiss example,
there is such a real variable Z that affects future °'' "t+i- But Zis
9also correlated with the current nominal interest rate Rt, so study of a
system omitting Z wril indicate that Rt Granger-causes Y even thoughit
does not when all relevant variables are recognizedThus the anti-RBC
16
evidencediscussed in the previous paragraph could be spurious.
Indeed, Litterrnan and Weiss go on to present evidence that they claim to
be supportive of this foregoing interpretation. The basis of their argument
is the absence of Granger causality from other variables to a vector
consisting of r, ''andir, the last of which is "that component of the
expected inflation innovation [that is] orthogonal to the contemporaneous
innovations in the real variables" (1985, P. 147). But while this finding is
consistent with their example, it does not actually imply a structure of the
RBC type: it is also consistent (for example) with a direct dependence of
on lagged values of nominal variables. All in all, then, the Litterman-Weiss
evidence neither supports nor contradicts in a convincing way the RBC point
of view.
4. Trend and Cyclical Components
In this section we continue by discussing the third type of pro-RBC
evidence mentioned above, not only for completeness but also because the
argument is itself of considerable interest.This argument, which was
17
developedinitially by Nelson and Plosser (1982), consists of two parts.
The first of these concludes, on the basis of statistical considerations to be
scrutinized below, that fluctuations in the cyclical component of aggregate
output (or employment) are small in comparison with fluctuations inthe
trend component of that variable. The second part relies on the presumption
that "monetary disturbances have no permanent real effects" (1982, p. 159)
10and so can contribute only to the cyclical componenL In that case the
maximum extent of monetary effects on output (or employment) is limited
by the variability of the cyclical component, and since that is small--
according to the first part of the argument—it follows that output variability
due to monetary fluctuations must be small.
Now in principle one could object to the second half of this argument,
basing his objection on the theoretical possibility of a "Tobin effect" of
18
sustainedinflation on the steady—state capital stock. But even if one accepts
the assumption. that such effects are quantitatively unimportant, he need not
accept the overall Nelson—Plosser argument, for the first part is also
debatable.Indeed, the remainder of this section will be devoted to the
counterargument that it is not in fact possible to determine, in the manner
19
sgestedby Nelson and Plosser (1982),that cyclical contributions to
observed fluctuations in real variables are small.
It will be useful to begin by reviewing the part of the Nelson-Plosser
argument concerning cyclical variability in some detail.To that end,
consider an observable variablesuch as the log of real GNP, whose
values can in principle be decomposed according to
(1) y=y+c
whereaMrepresent i.xxbservable "secular" and "cyclical" components,
respectively. On the basis of a priori understanding of what is meant by a
cyclical component, Nelson and Plosser take it as given that c is generated
by a process that has the property of stationarity. That presumption, which
will be retained here, then implies that any nonstationarity (such as a
11trending mean) in t mt be attributed to thesecular component '
For the next step in their argument, Nelson and Plosser take it tobe an
established fact—established by their empirical investigation ofseveral
relevant U.S. data series—that the y variable under disctsion is generated
by a process of the "difference stationary' orDS class. In other words, they
take as given the hypothesis that t is a variable whoseARMA (i.e.,
autoregressive-moving average) representationincludes a unit root in the AR
polynomial and no deterministic trend.Since c is stationary, it then
follows that the secular component y mt have a unit root inthe AR
polynomial of its ARMA representation. Consequently,the decomposition
(1) can be expressed as
(2) =(1-L)19(L)vt +
where v and u are white noise shocks driving the secular and cyclical
components, respectively, and where (3(L)and p(L) are polynomials in the
lag operator L that satisfy conditions for stationarityand invertibility.
Also, the meaning of (i-LY in (2) is as follows: (1—L) x =x÷ xj ÷
In addition, Nelson and Plosser also utilize the fact--established by their
evidence—that the differenced series is (for many of the variables
examined) appropriately represented as an invertible first-orderMA process
with a MA parameter that is positive and smaller than 1.0. In this case,
since (2) implies that
(3)(iL)yt=O(L)vt+(1-L)P(L)ut,
the first-order MA character of 11-t = requires that 0(L) =I+ 01L
with 0 < 01 < I and also that Ji(L)1. In other words, under the stated
restrictions (3) can be specialized to
12(4)
Finally, in this particular case the first autocorrelation coefficient for
is related to Oandthe variances of Ut andv in afashion that permits
the conclusion to be drawn that (with this autocorrelation positive)o must
be unambiguously larger than o.Indeed,the addition of some plausible U
side assumptions gives rise to the implication thatis several times as
large as crc.Inthis sense, then, Nelson and Plosser find that "the variance
in actual output changes is dominated by changes in the secular component
rather than the cyclical component ci" (1982, p. 155).
Now the foregoing argument is ingenious and rather appealing, but
consideration indicates that it includes a link that is both crucial and weak.
The link in question is the hypothesis thatis generated by a process of the
DS class, i.e., that its ARMA representation involves a unit root in the AR
polynomial and no deterministic trend component. That this hypothesis is
crucial for the specific conclusion (7 >is clear, for without that
hypothesis one is not led to the special representation (2) which, when
constrained by the evidence concerning autocorrelation magnitudes, yields the
implication cr>o. Also,the hypothesis is critical more generally (in the
context of cyclical/secular decompositions) in that it provides the basis for
the Nelson-Plosser and Stulz-Wasserfallen contentions that the extent of
cyclical movement is overestimated by typical trend-removal methods. An
illustration of its importance is presented below.
At this point, consequently, what needs to be explained is the sense in
which the DS hypothesis is dubious and therefore constitutes a weak link in
the Nelson-Plosser argument. Let us then consider in turn each of the three
13types of evidence in favor of the DS hypothesis presented byNelson and
Plosser. The first bit of evidence is simply that sample autocorrelations for
annual levels of y variables such as (the log of) real GNP are large and
decay slowly. But while that autocorrelation pattern is entirely consistent
with a random walk, it is also consistent with the behavior of a TS (trend
stationary) autoregressive series with a root close to 1.0. More interesting
perhaps is the second type of evidence regarding autocorrelations of annual
differences (1yt values).For the Nelson-Plosser variables, these
autocorrelations "in each case are positive and significant at lag one, but in
many cases are not significant at longer lags" (1982, p. 147). Thus,for
example, the first six autocorrelations for zyt with y denoting the log of
real GNP are as follows: 0.34, 0.04, -0.18, -0.23, -0.19, 0.01. Now
certainly that sort of pattern is reasonably well modelled by the first-order
MA process adopted by Nelson and Plosser. In the GNP case, for example,
the autocorrelation pattern is well matched by the process
(5) 'Yt='t°3t-i
where Et is white noise. But the pattern in question would also be well
matched by the process
(6) t =098t-i÷ p + .02yt + Et+O.3Etj
and would not be too badly matched by
(7) t =p.O2yt + 1-28t-i °3t2 ÷
both of which are obviously of the TS class. The point, of course, is the
14elementary one that one cannot establish with any degree of certainty that a
series is of the DS class simply by inspection of the autocorrelation
functions for its levels and differences.
For precisely that reason, Nelson and Plosser (1982, pp. 150-2) also
offer, as a third type of evidence, formal tests—based on procedures of
Dickey and Fuller (1979) (1981)—of the hypothesis that the AR polynomial
for the y, variable contains a unit root. As it happens, for each of the
variables examined (except the unemployment rate) the Dickey-Fuller test
does not call for rejection of the hypothesis that a unit root obtains. But
that fact is far from conclusive, for the reported test statistics would also
obviously result in non-rejection if the tested hypothesis were instead that
the relevant parameter is of value 0.98 (as in (6)) rather than 1.0. Indeed,
the Monte Carlo results reported in Nelson and Plosser's Table 1 indicate
that (with a sample size of T =100)standard deviations of the relevant test
statistic are of the order of magnitude of 0.05. Consequently, with a
significance level of 0.05, non-rejection would also be forthcoming for tests
23
ofhypotheses such as =0.95or even Pt= 0.90.
Of course Nelson and Plosser are very well aware of the inability of
finite—sample test procedures to distinguish conclusively between DS and TS
series; they "recognize that none of the tests presented, formal and informal,
can have power against a TS alternative with the AR root arbitrarily close
to unity" (1982, p. 152). What they do not mention, however, is the crucial
role of conclusions regarding DS vs. TS processes in their overall line of
argument. This argument builds upon a decomposition of series into secular
and cyclical components with the latter required to be stationary. The
15oyci ical component is then measured by whatever isie: over after an
estimate of a (DS) secular component--in practice, a randomwalk—is
removed. But if the process under study is actually one of the TS class with
an AR root close to unity, then the secular-componentremoval step can
easily take out many times as much of the signal as is properlyattributable
to the secular component, thereby yielding a many-fold underestimateof
cyclical variability. The procedure relies upon an accuratedetermination of
the variability provided by a component of the DS class, even though it is in
fact infeasible (in samples of the relevant size) to distinguish between
variability resulting from a unit root and variability associatedwith a root
close to, but distinct from, 1.0.
For an (extreme) illustration of this point regarding the removal of
variation approximated by a random walk, consider the first-order AR
process
(8)ytayt_i+Et
where Et is white noise with variance denoted ci. In this case if a is close
to 1.0 the process is close to a random walk, but with tat < 1.0 it is
nevertheless stationary—there is no DS component. But suppose that a
researcher models the series as a random walk= w and uses
the residusl variance V() as his estimate ofthevariance of the stationary
component. Then since












If then a =0.98,for example, V()/V(yt) =2(1-.98)0.04.In
other words, the estimated variance of the stationary portion is only 1/25 of
its true magnitude. Even with a less extreme a value of 0.9, the estimated
24
varianceis only 1/5 of the true value.
For many purposes, the practical impossibility of distinguishing between
a random walk and a process such as (8) with a close to 1.0 is of no great
consequence.If the object were to forecast near-futurevalues, for
example, the predictions would be essentially the same whichever of the two
representations was selected. In such cases, there is much to be said for
parsimoniouely setting a =Iand wing the random walk model. But if by
contrast the purpose is to estimate the forecast variance for the level of the
series 100 periods in the future, the choice between a =1.0and (say) a =
25
0.98becomes critical and basing this choice on the principle of parsimony
cannot be acceptable. The same is true, it would appear, when the purpose
of one's study is to decompose a series into cyclical and secular components.
The foregoing analysis does not, it should be emphasized, constitute a
claim that macroeconomic series such as (the log of) real GNP are members
of the trend-stationary class.The claim is only that the time series
evidence reported by Nelson and Plosser (1982), and likewise that developed
by Stulz and Wasserfallen (1985), is inadequate to determine whether the
17relevant series are of the DS or IS class. This evidence itself, then, sheds
little or no light on the issue of the relative variability of cyclical and
secular components of typical macroeconomic time series—and consequently
26
provideslittle or no support for the RBC hypothesis.
5. Nominal Price Stickiness
In the preceding sectiQns it has been argued that the main types of
evidence presented to date on behalf of the RBC hypothesis actually provide
very little support.Furthermore, there exists evidence that is
to some extent damaging to that hypothesis. But suppose that we accept the
alternative view that monetary policy actions do have significant effects on
aggregate output and employment.In that case, the question remains:
what theory or class of theories provides a satisfactory explanation for this
influence?
In previous papers (1980) (1982) I have described a type of model that
27
seemsto be at least qualitatively consistant with the main facts.The
simple model that I have used to illustrate the type is one in which prices
are sticky—indeed, formally rigid—within each period but adjust between
28
periodsin a mamer that respects the natural-rate hypothesis.It warrants
emphasis that the relevant nominal stickiness in this model pertains to
product prices, not wages.. If wage stickiness alone was responsible for
the real effects of monetary actions, with product prices adjusting flexibly,
then we should observe countercyclical movements in the real wage. That
we do not has recently been reconfirmed in a study by Bus (1985).
But whether in wages or prices, it remains a problem to explain why
nominal stickiness exists. That agents' utility pertains to real rather than
18nominal magnitudes is perhaps themostfundamental axiom of neoclassical
economics—its negation would destroy existing microeconomic theory—and
it seems implausible that the actual resource costs of changing price tags
are of significant magnitude. So what is it that accounts for nominal price
stickiness?
Before attempting a partial answer, let us pause to recognize that a
sizeable literature has accumulated in which multiperiod contracts between
buyers and sellers are endogenously explained as the outcome of optimizing
behavior by rational agents. But there are two aspects of the relevant
contractual arrangements that are crucial for the issue at hand: first, that
arrangements are made in advance of actual exchanges and, second, that
these arrangements involve exchange ratios (prices) expressed in nominal
terms. Virtually all of the existing research in the area—most of which
emphasizes risk and/or informational imperfections and asymmetries—is
concerned with only the first of these aspects, and thus in effect seeks to
explain contracts specified in real terms. These papers leave unanswered,
accordingly, the question of why contracts or prices are in so many cases
preset in nominal terms. They do not, in other words, explain why sellers
who set money prices in advance of sales do not make these prices contingent
upon movements in some general price index—why there is in this sense so
29
little"irxiexation" or, in the terminology of Eden (1983), "linkage."
Some writers on the subject have suggested that an important reason
for the paucity of linkage in the U.S. economy is that buyers and sellers
would usually prefer to link to different price indices (or nominal aggregates
such as the money stock). Blinder (1977, p. 70), for example, has put the
19argument as followE:
I suggest that risk-averse firms would be happy to link
factor payments to a price index which follows closely
the movements of their own output prices, but shy away
from contracts linking wages ...tosome broad index
whose movement might easily outstrip their selling
prices. Conversely, workers ...maybe unwilling to
bear the substantial risks of linking their factor
payments to the prices of firms forwhich they work
[andi prefer linkage to a broad price index more or
less representative of the things they buy.
But that argument evidently misses the point, for it explains why buyersand
sellers might have trouble in agreeing what the best of all possibleindices
would be, but not why they fail to agree to link to one of theobvious
candidates—e.g., the CPI. Failing to link to anysuch index is equivalent, it
should be noted, to linking to the particular (degenerate) index whosevalue is
constant over time. But why choose that index in preference tothe CPI?It
seems highly implausible that the constant indexcould do a better job than
the (P1 of eliminating risks for that vast majority of contractsthat
implicitly use it. The constant index is in principle preferableto the CPI




Anapproach that seems more promising beginswith the observation
that in most actual economies the medium of exchange is also used asthe
medium of account. Although the latter function could in principle beserved
by some commodity or commodity bundle otherthan money (the medium of
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exchange),it usually is not.In a typical monetary economy, then, a seller
who quotes prices in units other than the monetary unit of accountforces
potential buyers either to convert those prices into money prices orto agree
to a bargain expressed in unfamiliar terms. Either way, thisseller imposes
20some extra informational costs onto the buyer. Now these costs are quite
small in magnitude, obviously, and would be willingly accepted by the buyer
if they came along with other advantages. But the only advantage that is
necessarily associated with these computational costs is the reduction in
risk that is provided by the indexation. And in many cases, the value to the
buyer of the maximum possible reduction in risk will be exceedingly small—
even smaller than the value of the extra computational cost.
To develop credibility for this last assertion, I will proceed by posing
the following question for the reader: do you personally have an indexed
salary agreement with your employer? If not, why not? In my own case,
the first answer is "no" and the second answer is "because it seems pretty
unimportant." More specifically, my Dean and I both understand about the
effects of inflation on nominal salary agreements and we both know about the
guesses of -economic forecasters concerning the likely course of inflation
over the next year. So each year's nominal salary that we agree upon will
reflect the mean of the distribution of the random variable "next year's
inflation," that is, the "expected inflation rate." It is only the uncertainty
concerning this rate that provides any reason for indexation. But how much
uncertainty is there regarding the average inflation rate over the next year?
To me it seems reasonably certain that the realized value will lie within
2percentage points of the expected rate. How much, then, would I be
willing to pay for insurance to remove that amount of price level
uncertainty? The answer is certainly not zero, but it is also small enough
that I do not bother to even raise the issue with my Dean—and my guess is
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thatthe same is true for most readers.
21But the crucial point is this: whatever the value of insurance against
nominal risk in one's salary over a year, for the price of most products that
one purchases—books, phonograph records, sacks of coffee beans,boxes of
pasta—the value of insurance against nominal fluctuations mustbe vastly
smaller, probably two or three orders of magnitude. Consequently, I would
be willing to pay an insurance company exceedingly little—less, say, than
1/100 of one dollar—to insure me against the risk associated with
unanticipated inflation effects on coffee bean prices over the next quarter-
year. Indeed, the value to me ofsuch insurance is less than the value of the
computational costs that I would have to bear if my coffee bean supplier
were to price his merchandise in indexed terms. I would rather, that is,
that he simply post dollar prices for one—pound sacks of Columbian Suprerno.
My guess, then, is that the same is true for most buyers of most
products. Sellers, accordingly, respond to their customers' preferences by
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offeringproducts priced in terms of unindexed dollars.
It is important to note that this argument does not predict that there will
be no linkage or indexation. On the contrary, it suggests that the benefits of
linkage would outweigh the costs in the case of large contracts of long
duration—mortgages, for instance. One-year wage contracts are perhaps
close to the magnitude/duration combination that would make indexation
worthwhile. But for most final products sold to consumers, it seems clear
that the potential benefits of indexation are even smaller than the
computational cost due to the expression of prices in unfamiliar units.
It must be emphasized that the foregoing argument pertains only to the
second aspect of the nominal price stickiness puzzle, as described on p. 19.
22Thus it attempts not to rationalize the existence of price stickiness, but to
explain why any such stickiness that prevails could plausibly be in terms of
nominal prices. Our conclusion, however, is that there is a good reason to
believe that final product prices can rationally be expressed in nominal
terms. That implies that some analyses explaining the predetermination of
prices—the first aspect of the puzzle—may be reasonably interpreted as
pertaining to nominal prices, even if these analyses as developed are
logically applicable to the real terms of exchange arrangements. Some such
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analysismay, then, in combination with the foregoing argument, provide a
satisfactory theoretical rationalization for real macroeconomic responses to
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monetaryactior.
6. The Cost of Cyclical Fluctuations
As a final topic, I would like to comment briefly on a rather striking
proposition recently developed by Lucas (1985) concerning the relative
unimportance of business cycle fluctuations. In particular, by adopting some
plausible assumptions concerning individuals' preferences, Lucas was able to
relate the utility cost of consumption variability for a representative
household to the utility effect of a permanent increment to lifetime
consumption. Based on the magnitude of U.S. consumption fluctuations over
the postwar period, his conclusion is that "eliminating aggregate consumption
variability entirely would ...bethe equivalent in utility terms of an
increase in average consumption of something like one or two tenths of a
percentage point" (1985, p. 19). Furthermore, Lucas continues with the
following: "I want to propose taking these numbers seriously as giving the
order-of-magnitude of the potential marginal social product of additional
23advances in business cycle theory. Or more accurately, as a loose upper
bound—since there is no reason to think that eliminating all consumption
variability is either a feasible or a desirable objective of policy."
Now, as Lucas emphasizes, this is a number that may seem startlingly
small to many of us who are accustomed to think of macroeconomic
fluctuations—and stabilization policies—as of great quantitative importance
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forhuman welfare. Accordingly, I want to conclude by asking whether the
cited estimates by Lucas are convincing.
More specifically, we need to consider whether Lucas's estimates are
dependent upon any special assumptions concerning the source of the business
cycle or the type of economy in which the typical household resides. At first
glance, it would appear that there are no such assumptions involved, for the
only aspect of the economy that Lucas even discusses in deriving these
estimates is the utility function of the representative household.In his
words, the calculations are generated "without saying much more about the
nature or workings of the economy than ...[that]an economic system is a
collection of people and serious evaluation of economic policy involves
tracing the consequences of policies back to the welfare of the individuals
they affect" (1985, p. 21). And indeed the procedure is almost model-free.
But there is one assumption built into the argument that warrants explicit
mention. That is the assumption that cycles are generated by a process
which keeps fluctuations around some reference path and the level of that
path entirely separate. Stabilization policy, consequently, is by assumption
unable to affect the average level of aggregate consumption. Now to me that
is an attractive assumption—it is a variant of the natural-rate hypothesis
24mentioned above—but it must be recognized that it is notinnocuous
in the context of the present issue. If cyclical fluctuations were generated
by an economy of the type depicted by Barro and Grossman (1.976), for
example, then well-executed stabilization policy could enhance the average
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levelof consumption and thereby overturn Lucas's comparisons. The
assumption is a highly substantive one, not merely a matter of convention or
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terminology.
Throughout, this paper has taken positions that must be regarded
as more on the "Keynesian" than the "classical" side of the issues at hand.
As this is something that makes me uneasy, I would like to point out in
conclusion that the specific positions taken here do not constitute
endorsement of typical macroeconomic analysis of the pre—rational-
expectations variety. The two main failings of the latter were (i) reliance
on models that imply permanent output-inflation tradeoffs and (ii) emphasis
on point-in-time policy analysis of a type that permits dynamic
inconsistency. Acceptance of the arguments of the present paper does not
entail approval of either of those practices.
25Footnotes
1.This downturn is mainly due to the implausibility of the theory's
critical assumption that individual agents are unable to observe current
nominal magnitudes.For more discussion, see McCallum (1982) and
references therein.It should be said that implausibility under today's
conditions does not imply that ignorance of nominal aggregates was not
important in the past. Availability of macroeconomic data is now much
greater than before World War II.
2. For a helpful exposition and insightful discussion of the Kydland-Prescott
model, see Lucas (1985). A recent paper by Prescott (1986) is also
germane.
3. And not clearly described.
4. Kydland (1984) has explored elaborations that improve performance in
some ways, but do not bear on the problem discussed in the next paragraph.
5. This they can do, of course, because of the unobservability of technology
shocks.
6. Elementary calculations show that the Kydland-Prescott technology shock
has an unconditional standard deviation of 0.029 (quarterly data) -More
recently, Prescott (1986) has reported on some efforts to obtain an
independent measure of the magnitude of technology shocks. The procedure
is essentially that of attributing production function residuals to "technical
change," as in the growth accounting literature. In that literature, however,
it is usually presumed that the use of unadjusted capital and labor inputs
will result in a severe overestimate of the effects of technical change
(see, e.g., Denriison 1962).
267. To be more precise, Sims es incktrial production or real GNP and
Ml as his measures.
8. The innovation of a variable is the one—step-ahead prediction error
implied by the VAR system. The decomposition in question can onlybe
accomplished by "orthogonalizirig" the innovations, which is in principle
unsatisfactory as there are various possibilities for orthogonalizationand the
choice among them is arbitrary. But in practice Sims ameliorated this
difficulty by presenting results based on the orthogonalization that was most
unfavorable to his argument.
9. The figures are 37% in the monthly-data study in Sims (1980) and 36%
in the quarterly-data version in Sims (1982). These values are based on 48-
month and 14-quarter forecast horizons, respectively.
10. It should be kept in mind that, since all influences are attributed in this
innovation-accounting framework to the innovation in some variable,Sims's
argument also rules out substantial effects from non-surprise monetary
fluctuations.
11. An explicit example, illustrating this point, is worked out in McCallum
(1983).
12. In Sims (1980), the interest rate innovations account for 30% of the
explanatory power for industrial production—corresponding closely tothe
fall from 37% to 4% for the Ml innovations. In Sims (1982), the interest
rate figure is 19% while the Ml fall is from 36% to 14%.
13. For a detailed argument and additional references, see McCallum
(1985).
2714.It should be noted that Granger causality evidence is potentially
appropriate in this context, even thoughit is not in tests of the "policy
ineffectiveness" proposition that received so much attention duringthe late
1970s.The difference arises because the RBC hypothesis is more
stringent: while the policy ineffectiveness propositioncontends that only
surprise movements in nominalvariables have effects on real output and
employment, the RBC hypothesis rules out eventhis effect.
15. For subperiods of the 1949.2-1983.2 sample, rejections areobtained
at marginal significance levels of 0.0087 and 0.0033.See the portions of
their Table VII that appear on Litterman and Weiss's pages153-154.
16. The impact of that evidence is also considerably weakened bythe fact
that it pertains to data that has not been detrended in any way.Eichenbaurn
and Singleton (1986) show that the extent of Granger-causality fromnominal
to real variables in the postwar U.S. data is reduced bythe removal of a
linear trend from the logarithmic variables, and is virtusilyeliminated when
first differences are used instead ofloglevels. In this regard, however, the
argumentofSection4 below is relevant.
17. It has subsequently been utilized and/or developed further by Kingand
Plosser (1984), Wasserfallen (1984), Stulz and Wasserfallen (1985),and
Nelson(1985).
18.Nelsonand Plosser(1982, p.159)recognize this theoretical
possibility but assume that it is not of practical importance.
19. And also Stulz and Wasserfallen (1985).
20.For simplicity, let us abstractfrom thepossiblepresence of a seasonal
component.
2821. This class is contrasted with that of the "trend stationary" (or TS) type,
whose members include deterministic trend components (functions of
calendar time) and no autoregressive unit roots.It should be noted that
these two classes are not exhative.
22. In particular, the first autocovariance equals Oicr,- (1—Or)u1 -cr.
23.HereP1 is ted, as in Nelson and Plosser's equation (12), to denote the
relevant parameter.
24. That there is no trend in this example is of no consequence for the point
at hand.If the variable t reflected measurements relative to a linear
trend, for instance, withbeing the deviation from a random walk with
drift, then the same results would be obtained.
25. Here I am neglecting coefficient uncertainty of the type stressed by
McCulloch (1985).
26. It might be conjectured, moreover, that there is no purely statistical
procedure that will reliably discriminate between DS and TS series. If that
conjecture is correct, the task of understanding the extent of cyclical
variability—and whether it stems from monetary policy or other sources—
will have to rely upon the interaction of statistical analysis with substantive
economic theorizing, difficult and controversial though that path may be.
27. The four critical facts listed in McCallum (1982) are as follows:
(i) output and employment magnitudes exhibit significant persistence;
(ii) output and employment are strongly and positively related to
contemporaneous money stock surprises; (iii) output and employment are not
strongly and positively related to contemporaneous price level surprises; and
(iv) real wage movements are not countercyclical.
2928. As formulated by Lucas (19725), the natural-rate hypothesis asserts
that there is no path of nominal variables that will yield a permanent
increase in output (or employment) relative to its natural-rate value.
Effects of the type emphasized by Tobin (1965) alter the natural-rate value,
not the actual value relative to the latter.
29. Eden's (1984) own theory, incidentally, differs from the one sketched
below in that it hinges upon strategic informational considerations. A key
argument goes as follows:ilf ...allother sellers quote prices in fixed
dollar terms, the individual seller may find it difficult to make his price
contingent on the money supply. The reason is that information is not
prohibitively expensive, and buyers may suepect that the seller who offers a
contingent price has boht the information. They will, therefore, hesitate
to enter into a bet with him... It(Eden,1984, p. 259). That Eden stresses
linkages to the money stock rather than a price index is, incidentally, of
little importance in the present context.
30. Thoth expressed differently, this argument is, I believe, basically
similar to Parkin's (1977).
31. This approach, it should be noted, pertains only to the second aspect of
the puzzle described above.
32. On this subject, see Niehans (1978) and White (1984).
33. Some readers have pointed out that their own attitudes are influenced by
the ongoing nature of their employment relationships.
34. This argument does not prestnne that there is any explicit contractual
agreement between seller and buyers; its purpose is to explain the absence of
linkage arrangements that would provide, for example, daily adjustments in
30all nominal prices in a retail outlet such as a grocery store, leaving the
relative prices as implied by the shelf prices on individual items. The
argument is more appealing for consumer products than for inditrial goods.
35. A satisfactory analysis of the first aspect will have to take account of
Barro's (1977) important objection to Fischer-style contract models--i.e.,
that they neglect the quantity-determination provision of the contracts. In
this regard, emphasis on product markets, rather than labor markets, should
be useful as the less formal nature of ongoing relationships tends to induce a
tighter link between quantities exchanged and current prices.
36. It might reasonably be questioned whether the type of argument here
developed, which relies on the smallness of costs to individuals of failing to
index their contracts, can plausibly be responsible for cyclical fluctuations
that apparently have major effects on those individuals. A way in which
precisely this type of phenomenon can occur has recently been explained by
Akerloff and Yellen (1985).
37. The smallness of this number provides some indirect support, it should
be noted, for the argument of Section 5 above. There is a close relationship
between Lucas's conceptual experiment and the one implicit in my question
about salary indexation.
38. Even if expectations are assumed to be formed rationally.
39. Whether or not one works with a model in which '1a11 markets clear" is
a matter of convention, but whether this clearing pertains to auction-type
markets, or to ones with nominal contracts (perhaps implicit) that have
allocational effects, is not.
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